Systematic risk has been a focus for stress testing and risk capital assessment. Under the Vasicek asymptotic single risk factor model framework, entity default risk for a risk homogeneous portfolio divides into two parts: systematic and entity specific. While entity specific risk can be modelled by a probit or logistic model using a relatively short period of portfolio historical data, modeling of systematic risk is more challenging. In practice, most default risk models do not fully or dynamically capture systematic risk. In this paper, we propose an approach to modeling systematic and entity specific risks by parts and then aggregating together analytically. Systematic risk is quantified and modelled by a multifactor Vasicek model with a latent residual, a factor accounting for default contagion and feedback effects. The asymptotic maximum likelihood approach for parameter estimation for this model is equivalent to least squares linear regression. Conditional entity PDs for scenario tests and through-the-cycle entity PD all have analytical solutions. For validation, we model the point-in-time entity PD for a commercial portfolio, and stress the portfolio default risk by shocking the systematic risk factors. Rating migration and portfolio loss are assessed.
Introduction
Let n denote the size of a portfolio, and k the number of defaults in one-year horizon. Portfolio default rate in horizon is given by n k r /  . Assume that the default count k follows a binomial distribution, given the event probability ) (s p dictated by a latent factor s in horizon. We call ) (s p the portfolio level probability of default (PD) given systematic risk s in horizon. The quantity ) (s p contains all information for systematic risk. We can think of ) (s p as the asymptotic portfolio default rate, when portfolio size is sufficiently large ( [12] [18, p52] ). Under the Vasicek asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model framework ( [14] , [4, p.4-5] , [16] , [17] , [19] , [25] ), the PIT entity PD for a risk homogenous portfolio (see section 2.1 for definition), as shown in the next section, splits into two parts: where w and z are mutual independent, w represents the systematic risk depending on s, and z represents the entity specific risk depending on entity risk profile x.
It can be shown (see Proposition 2.3) that, under model (1.1), the systematic risk w and the TTC entity PD are respectively given by: In contrast, modeling of systematic risk is more challenging due to the data limitation of portfolio historical default rate time series, and the lack of efficient methodologies in parameter estimation. In practice, most PD models do not fully or dynamically capture systematic risk. Default contagion and feedback effects ( [3] , [9] , [11] , [13] ) are thus not captured. We will propose in section 2.2 a multifactor Vasicek model with residual for the systematic risk, using the parameter estimation methodology proposed in [27] .
As shown in later sections, advantages of the proposed models include: The proposed approaches extend to a general portfolio where it contains multiple segments with each homogeneous but heterogeneous between segments: train for the portfolio a probit model for entity specific risk and a multifactor Vasicek model (2.3) for systematic risk, calibrate each model over each segment, and follow (1.4) to combine systematic and entity specific risks by segment.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce model (1.1) under the Vasicek ASRF model framework, review the parameter estimation methodologies proposed in [27] for the multifactor Vasicek model (2.3), and show formulations (1.2) -(1.4). Analytical formulas for conditional PDs for stress testing are also shown in this section. We propose in section 3 the steps for scenario tests. An empirical example is given in section 4, where we model dynamically the entity PD for a commercial portfolio. Portfolio scenario loss and rating migration are assessed.
The author thanks his colleague Clovis Sukam, and two unanimous referees, for many valuable comments and insights, in particular one referee for the final definition for a portfolio to be risk homogeneous, as described in section 2.1.
Dynamic Entity PD Models under the Vasicek ASRF Model Framework 2.1. Point-in-Time and Through-the-Cycle Entity PDs
Under the Vasicek ASRF model framework ( [14] , [4, p.4-5] , [16] , [17] , [19] , [25] x , the probability of default in horizon for i-th entity is given by
where  denotes the average of
over the portfolio. We call i w the systematic risk and i z the entity specific risk for i-th entity. The portfolio is said to be risk homogeneous if i w is the same for all entities (i.e., asset correlation is the same for all entities), and i z can be regarded as being sampled independently from the same
Suppressing subscript i, we have:
The following lemma is important for subsequent discussions, where statement (b) is implied by statement (a). Statement (c) (see Appendix for a proof) implies that the volatility of default risk
given the systematic risk w, is an increasing function of w when 0  w , a generally desirable property for model (2.2).
. Assume that s and  are independent. Then 
2), we have the following proposition (see Appendix for a proof). Proposition 2.3. Under model (2.2), we have:
Multifactor Vasicek Models for Systematic Risk
In this section we propose approaches to modeling ), (s p i.e., the portfolio level PD in one-year horizon, given systematic risk s. Restriction to risk homogeneity is not required, and the discussion extends to a general portfolio. Recall that ) (s p contains all information for systematic risk.
We propose the following multifactor Vasicek model for .3) will follow the asymptotic maximum likelihood approach proposed in [27] . With this approach, portfolio default rate is equated to portfolio level PD, which in general exaggerates the variance of portfolio level PD, causing a bias to parameter estimates. For this reason, we propose a variance correlation as follows.
Variance correction to portfolio default rates:
(a) Assume a constant size n for the portfolio over time. (iii) For each parameter, calculate the average of all its bootstrap estimates. Select from all bootstrap models the one with parameters the closest to their parameter averages.
Conditional PDs
Plugging the multifactor Vasicek model (2.3) into model (1.4), we have:
where ' s and z are independent, ). , 0 ( ), , 0 ( ' 
Stress Testing for Portfolio Default Risk
Stress testing is widely used by financial institutions to assess the vulnerability to exceptional but plausible events. It is a tool complementing the existing internal models for capital allocation ( [2] , [5] , [8] , [10] , [13] , [15] , [23] ). In practice, stress testing focuses on systematic risk, with shocks from the external market or macroeconomic factors ( [7] , [13] , [24] ). With the dynamic model (1.4) and model (2.3), stress testing can be conducted through shocking the systematic risk factors in the model (2.3), then propagate to entity default risk by model (1.4). We focus on scenario tests. are to be generated appropriately. We propose the following steps for generating hypothetical scenarios: 
Scenario Generation

Scenario Tests and Loss Assessments
We propose the following steps for a scenario test: LGD EAD P Loss LGD the loss given default for facility j.
An Empirical Example -A Dynamic PD Model for a Commercial Portfolio
Modeling Systematic Default Risk
In this section, we model the portfolio level PD, i.e., ) (s p , for a US commercial portfolio, where historical 1-year default rates are available for each quarter between 2006 and 2012.
The delinquency rate for commercial and industry loans (no seasonal adjustment), posted by US Federal Reserve, is available since 1987. This is the macro variable we use for systematic risk modeling. Based on portfolio historical default data, internal portfolio default rate responds to US delinquency rate by a lag of two quarters.
We follow the steps proposed in section 2.2, do a variance correction to the default rates, and bootstrap 200 times. Each time we train a model of the form (4.1) below over the bootstrap sample: and c, the average its bootstrap estimates, and select from the bootstrap models the one with parameters the closest to their bootstrap averages. This is the final model we will use for systematic risk ) (s p .
Modeling Entity Specific Default Risk
For entity specific risk, we train a logistic model over a sample of portfolio historical data, is not a PIT model yet at the moment.
Scenario Tests
The portfolio is assumed to be risk homogeneous, e.g., entities have the same systematic risk (i.e. the same asset correlation), and each entity specific risk z can be regarded as being sampled independently from the same distribution Combine w and z together by (1.4). Scenario tests follow the steps (a)-(c) proposed in section 3.2, using the existing portfolio EAD and LGD models for the portfolio. We assume that each of these two models dynamically captures the exposure at default or the loss rate for a facility in the portfolio.
Results are shown in Table 1 below. Entities in the portfolio are grouped into investment (Inv), sub investment (Sub), and problematic (Prblm) grades, based on entity scenario PD given by expression (2.5).
The columns 2-6 in the table are respectively the current US delinquent rate, US delinquent rate in six months, current portfolio default rate, realized portfolio default rate in one year, predicted portfolio-level PD in one year given by Proposition 2.4(b), and scenario portfolio-level PD given by Proposition 2.4(a). Portfolio scenario loss (SL) is calculated as proposed in Section 3.2 (c), as a percentage of total portfolio exposure (the sum of all facility ij EAD in the portfolio).
Recall that the US delinquency rate in six months is the only macro variable used in the model (4.1) for the systematic risk. We are interested in two scenarios as highlighted in Table 1 nd quarter of 2010 (the end of one-year horizon), with a loss of 2.9% of the total portfolio exposure; while for the hypothetical scenario, the scenario portfolio loss reaches 5.3% of total portfolio exposure. Conclusion. In practice, most entity PD models do not fully or dynamically capture systematic risk. The approaches proposed in this paper allow systematic and entity specific risks to be modelled separately and then aggregated together analytically. Systematic risk is quantified and modelled by a multifactor Vasicek model with a latent residual, a factor accounting for default contagion and feedback effects. The asymptotic maximum likelihood approach for parameter estimation for this model is equivalent to least squares linear regression. Conditional entity PDs for scenario tests and TTC entity PD all have analytical solutions. Stress testing can be conducted by shocking the risk factors in the system risk component model.
